choice model and the (constant-variance) Thurstone categorical judgment model (Thurstone, 1927; Torgerson, 1958) on their ability to account for unidimensional absolute identification performance. Two subjects were required to identify eight auditory stimuli varying in loudness in a neutral and a payoff-biased condition. Kornbrot concluded that the experimental results provided strong evidence against the choice model of category judgment, and that the Thurstone model yielded impressive fits to the identification data. In this note, I suggest that Kornbrot's conclusion regarding the choice model was too strong. Kornbrot fitted a special case of Luce's choice model to the identification data by constraining the similarity parameters in the general model. The special-case choice model may have provided poor fits because inappropriate constraints were assumed. A choice model with slightly modified similarity constraints yields impressive fits to the identification data, ones that compare favorably with the fits of the Thurstone model.
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Assume n stimuli in an absolute identification experiment. Accordingto Luce's (1963) choicemodel, the probability that a subject makes response j given stimulus i, P(Rj ISi), is given by (3j7lij P(Rj ISi) = E{3k7lik ' k where 0~{3j,7lij~1, Ej= 1{3j= 1, 7lji= 7lij,and 7lii = 1. The {3j parameters are interpreted as response bias parameters, and the 7lij parameters are interpreted as similarity measures on the stimuli Si and Sj. The reader may verify that there are n -1 freely varying response bias parameters and n(n -1 )/2 freely varying stimulus similarity parameters (one for each pair of distinct stimuli). A constant-varianceThurstone model uses n-l Portions of this artkle appeared in an appendix of the PhD dissertation submitted by this author to Harvard Umversity. The work was supported by Grants BNS 80-26656 from the National Science Foundation and MH 37208 from the National Institute of Mental Health to Harvard Umversity, and by BRSG Grant S07 RR07031 from the Biomedical Research Support Grant Program to Indiana Umversity. I thank Diana Kornbrot and Michael Birnbaum for their helpful comments and suggestions for future research.
The author's mailing address is: Department of Psychology, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405. freely varying response bias parameters and n-1 freely varying stimulus scale parameters. To equalize the number of stimulus parameters used by the Thurstone model and the choice model, Kornbrot (1978, p. 196, Equation 18) introduced the following constraint equation for the choice model similarity parameters: 7lij = 7li,i+l, 7li+l,i+2 ... 7lj-l,j.
( 2) In this equation, the stimuli have been indexed in order of increasingmagnitudeon the unidimensionalcontinuum. Thus, the similarity between any two stimuli Si and Sj (i <j) is given by the product of similarities of the adjacent stimulus pairs that link Si and Sj. This results in n -1 free similarity parameters, one for each pair of adjacent stimuli. The use of this constraintequationwas motivated, in part, by a suggestion made by Luce (1963, p. 114, Axiom 3) .
In the original formulationof the choice model, Shepard (1957, pp. 333, 337) suggested an interpretation of the 7lijparameters in terms of distances in a psychological space. He assumed that 7lij = f(dij), (3) ( 1) where f is some monotonically decreasing function and the dijsare distances that satisfy the metric axioms (minimality, symmetry, and the triangle inequality). To reduce the number of parameters that needed to be estimated, Shepardsuggestedthat the stimulibe representedas points in a multidimensionalpsychologicalspace. The dijscould then be derived by computing the distances between the points in the space. The configuration of points that achieved the best account of the identification data was taken as the multidimensional scaling (MDS) solution for the stimulus set. I will refer to Equation 1 with the assumption that the similarity parameters are functionally related to distances in a psychological space as the MDSchoice model.
Kornbrot's constraint equation (Equation 2) has a simple interpretation in terms of the multidimensional scaling approach to modeling similarity. Assume that the n stimuli can be represented as points on a unidimensional psychological continuum and that distances on this continuum are additive. That is, assume
where dij is the distance between the points representing Si and Sj. (Again, the stimuli are indexed in order of increasing magnitude on the psychological continuum.) Then the product rule introduced by Kornbrot follows if
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that is, if similarity is an exponential decay function of psychological distance. In previous tests of the MDS-choice model, Shepard (1958a) found support for the assumption of an exponential decay function relating stimulus similarity to psychological distance. He noted in subsequent work (Shepard, 1958b (Shepard, , 1962 , however, that the best fitting similarity function might vary as a function of experimental conditions. Recently, Nosofsky (1984) conducted experiments in which subjects identified two-dimensional stimuli. The MDS-choice model was used to account for the confusion data in these experiments. It was found that a Gaussian similarity function provided much better accounts of the data than did an exponential decay similarity function. The use of a Gaussian function was suggested by previous theoretical work conducted by Shepard (1958b) , and by the well-known success of the Gaussian distribution in Thurstonian modeling. The Gaussian similarity function takes the form:
The MDS-choice model studied by Kombrot may have provided poor fits to her data because an inappropriate similarity function was used. It seemed reasonable to refit the model to her data using a Gaussian similarity function. To apply the model, one simply represents each stimulus as a point on a unidimensional psychological continuum. Letting Xibe the value of the point representing stimulus Si, the distance between Si and Sj is given by 
cal predictions. The parameters in the model are the locations of the points on the unidimensionalcontinuum (x" . . . , xn) and a set of response bias parameters (bl, . . . , bn)1 Table 1 presents the minimumchi-square values for the various models fitted to Kombrot's data.2 The first three columns give the chi-square values reported previously by Kornbrot (1978, p. 206, Table 2 . The Gaussian similarity function provides far better fits than the exponential decay similarityfunction. In fact, with the Gaussianassumption, the MDS-choice model provides slightly better fits than either Thurstone model in three of four cases, although it is slightly worse on the fourth.
A graphical comparison of the Gaussian and exponential decay similarity functions is provided in Figure 1 for Subject 1 in the payoff-biased condition. The following steps were followed in developing these graphs. First, maximum-likelihood estimates of the 1'/ij similarity parameters in the full-choice model were computed. By thejitll-choice model, I mean the choice model with the 1'/ij parameters unconstrained except for those initial constraints stated in Equation 1. Next, a set of interpoint distances was computed from the scaling solution derived by fitting the MDS-choice model to the absolute identification data. Two such sets of interpoint distances were computed, one from the scaling solutionin which a Gaussian similarity function was assumed and the other from the scalingsolutionin which an exponentialdecay similarity function was assumed. In the graphs shown in Figure 1 , the maximum-likelihoodunconstrained similarity parameters are plotted against the corresponding distance values computed from the scaling solutions. The solid curve in each graph is the theoreticalsimilarity function. As is evident, the Gaussian similarity function captures the underlying similarity structure far better than the exponential decay similarity function. It is not surprising, therefore, that the modified Gaussian-similarity MDS-choicemodel yieldedsuch improvedfits to the identification data.
The reanalysis reported here raises a questionon which I presently can shed little light. In addition to comparing the choice model and the Thurstone model in terms of overall goodness of fit, Kornbrot also used the method of constraint equations. The constraint equation approach suggested that the major problem with the choice model involved the bias constraints inherent in the general model, not the similarity constraints that were assumed in the special-case model. This suggestion is difficult to reconcile with the finding reported here, namely the dramatic improvement in overall fit achievedby using modified similarity constraints. This puzzle remains as an issue for future investigation.
Another question that arises concerns the experimental conditions that determine the best fitting similarity function. This questionwas studiedpreviouslyby Shepard (1958b) . Shepard developed an underlying process model that predicted an exponential decay similarity function under conditions of continuous reinforcement and feedback, and a Gaussian similarity function under conditions of infrequent feedback. In the experiments conducted by Kornbrot (1978) and Nosofsky (1984) , however, feedback was presented on every trial. Since a Gaussian similarity function was favored in these studies, feedback cannot be the sole controlling factor. One possibility concerns whetherthe observedbehavior is asymptoticor nonasymptotic. The experiments reported by Shepard (1958a) (in which an exponential decay function was favored) were NOTES AND COMMENT 91 learning studies in which subjects needed to learn the prevailing stimulus-response assignments. In contrast, Kornbrot (1978) and Nosofsky (1984) collecteddata from subjects who were well practiced and performing essentially at asymptote. Nosofsky (1984) fitted the MDSchoice model to several other absolute identification data sets. In all cases, the Gaussian similarity function was favored in studies that collected asymptotic performance data, whereas the exponentialdecay function was favored in studies that collected learning data. Regardless of the experimental factors that determine the form of the similarity function, the main conclusion drawn from the present work is that the Gaussian MDSchoice model provides impressive fits to Kornbrot's (1978) unidimensionalabsolute identificationdata. These fits are competitive with those provided by the Thurstone model of category judgment. As stated by Kornbrot (personal communication, December 1984) , "this is an interesting and intriguing result since it shows that two conceptually and mathematically different models actually provide equivalent fits to a relatively rich set of data. "R
